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Pragmatism and the Writing of
History
Roberto Gronda and Tullio Viola
1 The contributions presented in this symposium explore, from different perspectives,
the relationship between pragmatism and history, that is, the empirical study of the
human past. These connections run deep, and may be assessed on several counts.
2 First of all,  many pragmatist philosophers have devoted a great deal of attention to
investigating  the  nature  of  historical  knowledge  and  its  relevance  to  philosophy.
Classical  pragmatists  such  as  Peirce,  Dewey  and  Mead  laid  a  strong  emphasis  on
processuality and evolution as fundamental philosophical categories. At the same time,
they rejected intuitionist or a-priorist conceptions of knowledge, advocating instead a
continuity between philosophy and empirical inquiry. This approach was also sustained
by their general skepticism towards overly closed systems, and by a keen interest in
individuality and the unexpected consequences of experience. In this sense, it is not an
accident of their intellectual biographies that they also painstakingly reflected on the
methodology of historiography, and dedicated themselves in first person to concrete
historical studies (in particular, of science).1
3 In  continuance  of  the  original  insights  of  the  classical  pragmatists,  so-called  neo-
pragmatism  is  significantly  concerned  with  the  issue  of  historicity.  Morton  White,
Richard  Rorty,  Hans  Joas,  Joseph Margolis  –  to  name some of  the  most  prominent
figures – have all  contributed to the ongoing discussion over history’s  relevance to
philosophy,  although  in  ways  that  are  certainly  not  subsumable  under  a  single
perspective. At the same time, some major representatives of recent discussions in the
philosophy  of  history  have  recognized  pragmatism  as  a  crucial  interlocutor,  in
particular  with regard to  the  philosophical  puzzles  that  concern the  nature  of  our
knowledge about the past.2
4 The interest of pragmatist philosophers in history is accompanied by a complementary
interest of professional historians in pragmatism. Such interest dates back to the first
decades of the twentieth century, with the work of influential historians (almost all
based at  Columbia University,  where pragmatism was exerting a strong intellectual
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influence) such as James Harvey Robinson, Charles and Mary Beard, Merle Curti, John
Herman Randall Jr., Carl Becker and Richard Hofstadter.3 But it still endures today, both
in America and Europe, in new and original forms. Some recent historians have even
greeted the advent of a new “pragmatist” or “pragmatic” turn in their discipline: an
attitude  that  combines  some  original  pragmatist  tenets  with  insights  coming  from
different traditions.4 By so doing, they have also contributed to a larger debate that is
taking place among social  scientists  about  the spatial  and temporal  situatedness  of
human action. And, indeed, the role of the social sciences must not be underestimated.
Starting with Dewey and Mead,  the reflection on pragmatism and history has gone
hand in hand with a broader reflection on the status of the social sciences.
5 In the attempt to take seriously this diversity of approaches, the present symposium is
directed both to philosophers who approach history with a distinctively philosophical
agenda in mind,  and to historians or historically-minded social  scientists  who have
seen in pragmatism an important source of clarification, conceptual or methodological
alike.
6 The  essays,  interview  and  reviews  that  make  up  the  symposium  aspire  to  depict
different aspects  of  our central  question.  A first  block of  papers offers  interpretive
approaches to  the thought of  classical  pragmatists.  Ambrosio,  Colapietro,  and Topa
focus on Peirce’s interest in both the philosophy of history and history as an empirical
discipline; Niklas looks at the debate on historical knowledge that has involved many
pragmatists  of  the  early  twentieth  century;  Huebner  analyzes  Mead’s  work  as  a
historian and philosopher of history. A second block of papers considers some crucial
insights of classical pragmatism in relation to more encompassing debates about the
relevance and purport of  historical  knowledge.  Andrew Abbott investigates Dewey’s
and Mead’s understanding of temporality in the context of a processual approach to
social theory; Laas’ and Tozzi’s essays reflect on the relevance of Peirce, Dewey and
Mead to actual discussions about narrativism and realism; and Jonathan Gorman looks
back at his own intellectual path as a philosopher of history influenced by pragmatist
ideas. Finally, David Marshall explores the work of Max H. Fisch, a twentieth-century
intellectual historian who found a major source of inspiration in his monumental study
of Peirce.
7 The essays are followed by some further material. Oliver O’Donnell publishes here for
the  first  time  (and  supplies  with  an  introductory  essay)  a  manuscript  by  Allan
Marquand, the Princeton art historian and ancient student of Peirce’s who, in the text
here presented, is shown to seize on Peircean philosophy to articulate the tasks of art
history. Finally, two interviews complete the symposium: the first is with Hans Joas,
who  has  repeatedly  written  about  pragmatism’s  ability  to  reconcile  genetic  and
systematic  (or  normative)  approaches to the study of  concepts and values;  and the
second is with Paris historians Yves Cohen and Simona Cerutti, two major proponents
of a “pragmatist” approach to history (see also Bruno Settis’s review).
8 As  is  easy  to  see  from this  brief  survey,  we  have  explicitly  eschewed a  systematic
approach to the topic of pragmatism and history – an approach that would have forced
the  exchanges  we  aim  to  reconstruct  into  the  procustean  bed  of  pre-established
categories. Nor have we tried to suggest that pragmatism enjoys some sort of “special
relationship” to history. We are well aware that,  on the one hand, there have been
pragmatist  philosophers  who were  not  especially  interested  in  history;  and  on  the
other,  there  have  been  other  philosophical  traditions  (such  as  phenomenology  or
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Marxian thought)  which had an even stronger impact on historiographical  practice
than pragmatism.
9 We do believe, however, that pragmatism has been, is and will likely continue to be an
important interlocutor for historians and philosophers of history, in virtue of some
profound theoretical motives that are inscribed into its very roots. From a variety of
angles, all texts presented here shed light on this basic conviction. Our task will be
achieved  if  we  contribute  to  furthering  the  exchange  between  pragmatism  and
historical studies, by inviting scholars to address the purport of a dialogue that, more
or less implicitly, has been going on for decades.
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NOTES
1. See in particular Peirce 1985; Mead 1932, 1936; Dewey (1938: Ch. 12).
2. See Ankersmit 2005. For an earlier reception, see Gallie 1952 and 1964.
3. See Kloppenberg 2004, whose title is intentionally echoed by that of the present symposium.
4. See the conversation with Yves Cohen and Simona Cerutti in the symposium.
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